[[Summary: "The Legislature, in Part II of Chapter 447, Florida Statutes, clearly stated its intent that the Commission promote the bargaining process and agreements arising therefrom. Accordingly, we will not assume a later statutory amendment to the school law statutes automatically amends an existing agreement covering public school employees to materially change its negotiated terms. [1/ The Commission lacks authority to determine whether direction from the Legislature that existing contracts should automatically be amended by subsequent legislation would be constitutional. But see Art. 1, S 10, Fla. Const."]]

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STATE OF FLORIDA
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RELATIONS COMMISSION
COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL 3180, Charging Party,
V.
INDIAN RIVER COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, Respondent.
Case No. CA-95-085
FINAL ORDER
Order Number: 96U-157
Date Issued: July 31, 1996

Paul A. Donnelly, Gainesville, attorney for charging party.
G. Russell Petersen, Vero Beach, attorney for respondent.

On November 11, 1995, Local 3180 filed an unfair labor practice charge alleging that the School Board violated Section 447.501(l)(a) and (c), Florida Statutes. On January 3, 1996, ihe commission's General Counsel found the charge sufficient to the extent that it alleged that the School Board committed an unfair labor practice by unilaterally altering the employees' right to continued employment created by Section 231.3605, Florida Statutes. The remainder of the charge was summarily dismissed. Local 3180's amended charge was dismissed by the General Counsel on February 7, and Local 3180's appeal of the summary dismissal was denied by the Commission on March 11.

The hearing officer conducted an evidentiary hearing, heard argument, and issued a recommended decision on June 11, 1996, concluding that the charge should be dismissed. Local 3180 filed two exceptions to the hearing officer's findings of fact and two exceptions to the conclusions of law.

The two exceptions to the hearing officer's facts are easily addressed. One objects that the hearing officer failed to find a fact, proposed by Local 3180, and the other objects to one fact the hearing officer found that Local 3180 contends is unnecessary. We agree with the hearing officer that all the pertinent facts are contained in the findings. Upon review, those findings are supported by the record and reasonable inferences therefrom. Heifetz v. Department of Business Regulation; 475 So.2d 1277 (Fla. 1st DCA 19855). Accordingly, the exceptions to the findings offact are denied. The exceptions to the conclusions of law raise more difficult issues of contract and statutory interpretation.

Although phrased differently, the two exceptions to the hearing officer's recommended conclusions of law essentially raise the same legal issue; that is, did the enactment of Section 231.3605, Florida Statutes, automatically amend the existing collective bargaining contract between these parties so that the contract precluded the School Board from non-renewing the eight annual contract employees. We address these exceptions together.

At the time the contract was negotiated and ratified, it was understood by both parties that the employer could non-renew annual contract employees without being subject to the contract'sgrievance/arbitration procedure. The Legislature then created a property interest in continued employment for annual contract employees, effective July 1, 1994, one year before the contract expired.

After Section 231.3605 became effective, and after the eight annual contract employees were not renewed, Local 3180 filed collective bargaining contract grievances alleging violations of the discharge and lay-off articles in the contract and the "Florida School Laws." Local 3180 asserted that the articles governing discharge and lay-off now applied to non-renewal in the hiatus between annual contracts as well as to mid-year dismissal or lay-off.

The hearing officer succinctly analyzed the arguments now presented by Local 3180. We have also researched the law in this area as is our responsibility under the Administrative Procedures Act, Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. A new or amended statute may become a part of an existing contract. Standard District Company v. Florida Department of Business Regulation, 473 So.2d 216 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). However, the Legislature may not "enact a statute that impairs obligations of contracts or vested rights." Ibid at 219. A change in a statute does not automatically invalidate a conflicting contract clause unless the parties agreed to be bound by statutory amendments. Kosow v. Condominium Association of Lakeside Village, 512 So.2d 349 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987), rev. den., 520 So.2d 984 (Fla. 1987).

The hearing officer found that the parties did not expressly agree to be bound by the statutory amendment of the school laws. HORO at 7, 8. Our review of the record, especially Article XII, Section A of the contract supports the hearing officer's finding. He also found the change is not merely procedural; it is a material change in management/employees, rights and obligations. This finding is also supported by the facts.

The Legislature, in Part II of Chapter 447, Florida Statutes, clearly stated its intent that the Commission promote the bargaining process and agreements arising therefrom. Accordingly, we will not assume a later statutory amendment to the school law statutes automatically amends an existing agreement covering public school employees to materially change its negotiated terms. [1/ The Commission lacks authority to determine whether direction from the Legislature that existing contracts should automatically be amended by subsequent legislation would be constitutional. But see Art. 1, S 10, Fla. Const. However, the Legislature did not attempt to make Section 231.3605 retroactive.]

As the District Court, First District, succinctly stated: "A statute is presumed to be prospective unless the Legislature manifests a contrary intention in the statute itself." Seitz v. Duval County School Board, 366 So.2d 119 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), cert. den., 375 So.2d 911 (Fla. 1979). Or, put another way, "statutes that interfere with vested rights will not be given retroactive effect." Young v. Altenhaus, 472 So.2d 1152, 1154 (Fla. 1985).

Moreover, the terms "discharge" and "non-renew" have distinct meanings in labor nomenclature. As we stated in the Order Affirming General Counsel and Directing Hearing:
The contract has a just cause provision for discipline
and discharge or lay-off of
employees. This does not include the non-
renewal of an annual contract employee. These
are different terms with different meanings
for purposes of a collective bargaining
contract. In re: Palm Beach County Association
of Educational Secretaries and Office Personnel, 10 FPER  15177 (PERC 1984) ...
Thus, the parties have not expressed an intent
to include a non-renewal in the article
governing discharge or lay-offs.
Slip Op. at 3. Therefore, Local 3180 is arguing for the Commission to read a meaning into the collective bargaining contract that its negotiators did not intend.

The parties must adhere to the contract as they understood it at the time it was negotiated and signed. This is the same situation in which the parties would be in if the Legislature had passed a law reducing instead of increasing employee rights contained in Florida's public school statutes. In that event, we doubt if Local 3180 would be contending the statute automatically amended the existing contract.

Accordingly, we accept the hearing officer's conclusions of law and findings of fact. The unfair labor practice charge in this case is dismissed. Local 3180's ancillary request for remedies and attorney's fees is denied.

This order may be appealed to the appropriate district court of appeal. A notice of appeal must be received by the Commission and the district court of appeal within thirty days from the date of this order. Except in cases of indigency, the court will require a filing fee and the Commission will require payment for preparing the record on appeal. Further explanation of the right to appeal is provided in Sections 120.68 and 447.504, Florida Statutes, and the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Alternatively, a motion for reconsideration may be filed. The motion must be received by the Commission within fifteen days from the date of this order. The motion shall state the particular points at fact or law allegedly overlooked or misappreheided by the Commission, and shall not reargue the merits of the order. For further explanation, refer to Florida Administrative Code Rule 38D-15.005.

It is so ordered.
HORNE, Chairman, ANTHONY and GOODING, Commissioners, concur.

I HEREBY CERTIFY that this document was filed and a copy served on each party on July 31, 1996.

BY: Mary Ann Burns
Clerk