Broward County Classroom Teachers

Association, Inc., Charging Party,

V.

School Board of Broward County, Florida, Respondent.

Case No.CA-80-019;Order 80U-102(May 21, 1980)

Before Powers, Chairman; Parrish and Parker, Commissioners

Mark Kelly, Tampa, attorney for charging party.

Mark Seigle, Ft. Lauderdale, representative for respondent.

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

PER CURIAM. On March 24, 1980, the Broward County Classroom Teachers Association, Inc. (CTA) filed an unfair labor practice charge which alleged that the School Board of Broward County, Florida, (School Board) had violated Section 447.50l(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1979), by removing United Teaching Profession insignia stickers placed on school mail-boxes assigned to CTA members. Upon consideration, the Commission concludes that the charge fails to state a prima facie case of violation of Section 447.501(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1979).

The charge indicates that small (approximately 2 cm. in diameter) epitrochoidal stickers bearing the Greek letter "Pi" intersected by a wedge were placed on school mailboxes assigned to CTA members at Northeast High School by CTA representative Carl Flowers on October 19, 1979. These stickers indicated membership in the CTA and United Teaching Profession. On October 26, 1979, Northeast High School Principal Robert Schmelz asked Flowers whether he had placed the stickers on the mailboxes. Flowers replied in the affirmative. By Monday, October 29, 1979, the stickers had been removed by a person or persons unknown to either the School Board or the CTA. On October 29, 1979, Flowers filed a grievance seeking replacement of the stickers. During the Step I grievance meeting, Schmelz stated that non-CTA employees had complained to him regarding the stickers, indicating that the stickers not only identified CTA members but, by default, identified non-members as well. Schmelz also stated that the CTA could identify members' mailboxes via thumbtacks or similar nonrepresentational markings. Schmelz's denial of the grievance at Step I cited both of these factors as a reason for denial of the grievance. The grievance was also denied at Step II (Superintendent's office).

The evidence supplied by the CTA indicates that similar stickers have been placed on teacher mailboxes in other schools. The March, 1980, issue of "The Personnel Forum," a School Board house organ for administrative personnel which purports to state the official position of the Personnel division of the School Board, emphatically directs administrators not to remove any CTA mailbox stickers present in the schools for which they are responsible, and goes on to state that the sticker issue will be handled on a school-by-school basis, as necessary, if grievances concerning sticker placement are raised by non-CTA employees.

Article XXIV(N) of the current School Board-CTA collective bargaining agreement provides:

No employee shall be prevented from wearing pins or other identification of membership in the CTA or its affiliates.

The CTA alleges that this article was violated by the removal of the stickers.

The essential legal question presented by the instant charge is not whether the CTA possesses a contractual right to place union stickers on the school mailboxes of teachers, but rather whether employees possess a protected right to place union insignia in the form of stickers on the property of their employer. The evidence supplied by the CTA indicates that the CTA does not dispute that the school mailboxes are the property of the School Board. The Commission concludes that Section 447.301 does not confer upon public employees the right to affix union insignia stickers to their employer's property.

It is well settled that employees possess a right protected under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. ¶ 157, as amended (1974), to wear union insignia, absent special circumstances which justify restriction of the right. As early as 1938, the NLRB ordered reinstatement of an employee discharged for wearing a union steward button. Armour and Co., 8 NLRB 1100, 3 LRRM 202 (1938). The right of employees to wear union insignia was upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Republic Aviation Corp v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 16 LRRM 620 (1945). An employee's right to display union insignia is recognized to extend to insignia affixed to personal tool boxes⁽¹⁾, and to those displayed on employees' cars in employer-owned parking lots.⁽²⁾

But the right to wear union buttons or to display union insignia on personal property in furtherance of self-organization is not unlimited. Where the wearing of union buttons by employees violated a long standing employer rule prohibiting the wearing of buttons of any description and was unrelated to "any concerted campaign to organize the employees, or to promote collective bargaining, or to gain better hours, wages, or working conditions," an employer's ban on union buttons has been upheld. NLRB v. Harrah's Club, 337 F.2d 117 (9 Cir. 1964). Likewise, where the wearing of buttons has posed a threat to industrial safety or efficient production, the banning of buttons has been sustained. Standard Oil of California, 168 NLRB 217, 66 LRRM 1277 (1967); Fabri-Tek v. NLRB, 352 F.2d 577 (8 Cir. 1965); Evergreen Nursing Home and Rehabilitation Center, Inc., 198 NLRB 775, 80 LRRM 1824 (1972). Finally, when the proscription of disruptive buttons is reasonably necessary to maintain peaceful labor relations, it has been upheld. Boeing Airplane Co. v. NLRB, 217 F.2;1 369 (9 Cir. 1954); United Aircraft Co., 134 NLRB 1632,49 LRRM 1384 (1961). Most significantly, the NLRB has declined to find that employees have a protected right to apply union stickers to the property of their employer. Threads, Inc., 124 NLRB 134, 44 LRRM 1553 (1959); American Logging Tool, Inc., 109 NLRB 971; 34 LRRM 1500 (1959).

The protection of "concerted activities" under Section 447.301(3), Florida Statutes (1979), is substantially identical to that of Section 7 of the NLRA. Accordingly, the Commission is of the view that the principles outlined above should also be applied to Florida Public sector employment.⁽³⁾ Therefore, considered in light of these principles, the refusal of the School Board to permit replacement of the stickers on the mailboxes does not constitute a violation of Section 447.501(l)(a), Florida Statutes. The Commission concludes that the CTA has no protected right to place union stickers on the mailboxes provided by the School Board.

This conclusion does not turn on the existence or nonexistence of Article XXIV of the School Board-CTA agreement or of any other contractual provision between the parties. It simply constitutes recognition of the property right of a public employer to determine the manner in which its facilities will be decorated. As this case indicates, in determining whether to permit the posting of union insignia on its property, an employer must consider the interests of all its employees in order to maintain harmonious labor relations. The matter is simply within the discretion of a public employer, as long as the discretion of the employer is exercised in a non-discriminatory fashion.

Accordingly, pursuant to Section 447.503(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1979), the charge in this case is DISMISSED.

It is so ordered.

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1. Halliburton Services, Freightmaster Div., 186 NLRB 3, 76 LRRM 1481 (1970); R. C. Le Tourneau. Inc., 200 NLRB 425,82 LRRM 1156 (1972).

2. Southwire Co., 159 NLRB 374,62 LRRM 1280 (1966).

3. Seitz v. Duval County School Board, 4 FPER ¶ 4154 (1978).