OFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF THE
FLORIDA SCHOOL LABOR RELATIONS SERVICE
O R D E R
S U M M A R Y
PLEASE COPY TO SCHOOL BOARD MEMBERS
AND
ADMINISTRATORS AS NEEDED.
**School Board
Cases
VOL. XXV June 20, 2001 NO. 21
OFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF THE FLORIDA SCHOOL
LABOR RELATIONS SERVICE
PART I. ORDERS ISSUED BY PERC
CB-2001-001; Order
01U-139 (June 5, 2001)
LEONARD DePAOLA,
Charging Party,
v.
DAVIE PROFESSIONAL
FIREFIGHTERS, LOCAL 2315, Respondent.
A[T]he hearing
officer issued an order recommending that the unfair labor practice be
dismissed, based upon the undisputed facts as represented by DePaola. The hearing officer also recommended that
Local 2315 not receive an award of attorney's fees and costs, even though it
had prevailed in a motion to dismiss DePaola's unfair labor practice charge
without a hearing. ... Because this matter was resolved
without a hearing, the hearing officer assumed the facts as alleged by DePaola
to be true.
... The events that
led to DePaola's demotion and dismissal occurred in 1993, while he was a member
and president of Local 2315. However,
DePaola was not a member of Local 2315 at the time of his 2000 demotion and dismissal
or at the time he requested Local 2315 to represent him. Accordingly, when DePaola asked Local 2315
to represent him in a collective bargaining grievance concerning his dismissal,
it declined because he was not a member.
Local 2315 informed DePaola that he could pursue the grievance on his
own.
... In Galbreath
v. School Board of Broward County, 7 FPER & 12287 (1981), aff=d, 424 So.2d 837
(Fla. 4th DCA 1982), aff=d, 446 So.2d 1045
(Fla. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 801 (1984), the Florida Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 447.401, Florida Statutes, which
provides a unique procedure whereby a certified union may choose not to
represent a bargaining unit employee who is not a member of the union. This is an exception to the concept of
exclusive representation, allowing a union the right to determine whether it
desires to represent nonmembers in grievances.@
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RA-2001-007; Order
01E-140 (June 6, 2001)
COASTAL FLORIDA
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, Petitioner,
v.
FLAGLER COUNTY
SHERIFF'S OFFICE, Respondent.
PERC grants the
unopposed petition to voluntarily recognize a unit of noncertified employees of
the Sheriff=s Office.
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CA-2001-021; Order
01U-141 (June 8, 2001)
FLORIDA PUBLIC
EMPLOYEES COUNCIL 79, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, LOCAL 3817, Charging Party,
v.
THE HOUSING
AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, Respondent.
PERC denies the
union=s petition for an
extension of time.
AThe instant motion
is untimely because it was not filed prior to the expiration of the deadline
sought to be extended as required by Florida Administrative Code Rule
28-106.204(5). Furthermore, in our last
order extending the Charging Party's time we stated that no further extensions
would be granted. The Charging Party
has had a total of 55 days in which to amend its charge from the date the
charge was summarily dismissed.@
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CA-2001-028; Order
01GC-142 (June 11, 2001)
PAUL MICHAEL HAAS,
Charging Party,
v.
CITY OF LIVE OAK,
FIRE DEPARTMENT, Respondent.
The General Counsel
summarily dismisses the charge that the employer violated the Act by the manner
in which Haas was treated and reprimanded with respect to a previous letter of
warning. The charge is not sufficiently
clear enough to find a prima facie violation.
That portion of the charge alleging a discriminatory discharge is
deficient because it does not state the reason for the December 29 reprimand.
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RC-2000-045; Order
01E-143 (June 11, 2001)
STATE EMPLOYEES
ATTORNEYS GUILD, FPD, NUHHCE, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
PERC dismisses the
petition to certify a unit of attorneys employed by the State of Florida
(State).
This year=s Legislature has
mandated that the classification system be structured in such a way that every
confidential, managerial, and supervisory employee be included in the SES and
designated as either managerial/policymaking, professional, or nonmanagerial
nonpolicymaking.
AA review of this
new legislation reveals a strong State policy towards a more comprehensive
organizational structure of the SES that groups occupations together with
respect to benefits and rewards rather than compartmentalizing them. Defining a bargaining unit limited to one
profession, whose community of interest, albeit strong, is not so unique as to
justify a separate bargaining unit, would contravene this policy.
... Moreover, were
we to determine that a bargaining unit comprised solely of attorneys is
appropriate, a significant potential exists for at least four additional SES
bargaining units, which would then increase the number of Statewide bargaining
units to fourteen. (Finding of Facts 8
and 19). Additional bargaining units of
non-professional SES employees could also be requested because the new
legislation reclassifies a substantial portion of the State's career service work
force as SES employees. In turn, this
would result in a concomitant adverse effect upon the efficient administration
of government at the state level because the automatic impasse provision of
Section 216.163(6), Florida Statutes, limits the bargaining cycle of each unit.@
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UC-2001-020; Order
01E-144 (June 12, 2001)
NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, LOCAL R-5 186, Petitioner,
v.
CITY OF PALM BAY,
Agency.
PERC dismisses the
petition to clarify unit number 957 by including fleet support technician in
this blue-collar unit.
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UC-2001-021; Order
01E-145 (June 12, 2001)
NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (NAGE), LOCAL R-5 197, Petitioner,
v.
CITY OF PALM BAY,
Respondent.
PERC dismisses the
petition to clarify unit number 712 because the petitioner is not currently
registered with the Commission.
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CA-2001-027; Order
01GC-146 (June 12, 2001)
FLORIDA PUBLIC
EMPLOYEES COUNCIL 79, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Charging Party,
v.
GOVERNOR JEB BUSH,
STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent.
The General Counsel
summarily dismisses the charge that the employer violated the Act by
dominating, interfering with, or assisting in the formation, existence, or
administration of, any employee organization or contributing financial support
to such an organization. That portion
of the charge alleging a violation for interference or coercion is found
sufficient and ordered to an evidentiary hearing.
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EL-2001-017
(Relates to RC-2000-088) (June 18, 2001)
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT
UNION LOCAL 1395, AFL-CIO, Petitioner,
v.
ESCAMBIA COUNTY
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, Respondent.
Election Results
and order certifying unit number 1332 for wall-to-wall blue and white collar
employees. 325 eligible voters cast 157
ballots for and 143 against the union.
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EL-2001-004
(Relates to RC-2000-056); Order 01E-147 (June 18, 2001)
PROFESSIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF CITY EMPLOYEES, Petitioner,
v.
CITY OF
JACKSONVILLE, Respondent,
v.
FLORIDA PUBLIC
EMPLOYEES COUNCIL 79, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL
EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO, Intervenor.
Election results
and order dismissing objections to the petition to represent a non-professional
unit of employees. 2424 eligible voters
cast 441 ballots for the petitioner, 411 for the intervenor and 863 against
both unions.
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CA-2001-031; Order
01GC-148 (June 18, 2001)
GARY C. BALLARD,
Charging Party,
v.
CITY OF ORLANDO,
FIRE DEPARTMENT, Respondent.
The General Counsel
summarily dismisses the charge that the employer violated the Act by refusing
to process a grievance to arbitration.
A determination otherwise was precluded because Ballard failed to
provide a written notice of his desire to submit the matter to arbitration.
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EL-2001-008
(Relating to RC-2000-049); Order 01E-149 (June 19, 2001)
FLORIDA STATE
LODGE, FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, INC., Petitioner,
v.
CITY OF FORT
LAUDERDALE, Respondent,
v.
BROWARD COUNTY,
LOCAL UNION 532, AFSCME, Intervenor.
Election results
and order revoking certification 419 and certifying unit 1334 for FOP. 1012 eligible voters cast 320 ballots for
FOP, 249 for AFSCME and 3 for no union.
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CB-2001-004; Order
01U-150 (June 19, 2001)
ERIN PERCIVAL,
Charging Party,
v.
SOUTHWEST FLORIDA
PROFESSIONAL FIREFIGHTERS AND PARAMEDICS, LOCAL 1826, IAFF, INC., Respondent.
PERC dismisses the
charge that the union violated the Act by the manner in which it conducted a
ratification election.
ALocal 1826 did not
violate Section 447.501(2)(a), Florida Statutes. The hearing officer also determined that neither party was
entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs. No exceptions were filed to the hearing officer's order.@
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RA-2001-006; Order
01E-151 (June 19, 2001)
COASTAL FLORIDA
POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner,
v.
FLAGLER COUNTY
SHERIFF'S OFFICE, Respondent.
PERC grants the
voluntary recognition of unit 1335 for, AAll members of the Corrections division
employed as detention deputy, detention deputy 1st class, detention
corporal, and detention sergeant.@
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PART II Court Orders
[From Attorney
General=s Appellate Alert]
U.S. Supreme Court
ADamages cap on
workplace harassment ... Workers who are
mistreated on the job are not limited to receiving a maximum of $300,000 in
"front pay" damages, the U.S. Supreme Court held.
The unanimous court
concluded that front pay is not an element of compensatory damages under 42
U.S.C. ' 1981a and thus is
not subject to the damages cap imposed by the law. ...
"Because front
pay is (an authorized) remedy, Congress did not limit the availability of such
awards in '1981a. Instead, Congress sought to expand the
available remedies by permitting the recovery of compensatory and punitive
damages in addition to previously available remedies, such as front pay,"
Justice Thomas wrote for the court.
[Pollard vs. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Company, 6/4/01]@
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AReligious use of
public school facilities ...
Religious organizations may use public school facilities after school
hours without violating the constitutional separation of church and state, the
U.S. Supreme Court held.
In a 6-3 decision,
the court ruled in favor of the Good News Club, a private Christian club for
children ages 6 to 12, which had, been barred from school grounds by the school
district in Milford, New York. The
court said permission by school districts for such use would not amount to an
impermissible governmental endorsement of religion, but to exclude religious
clubs from using the facilities would amount to improper discrimination because
other organizations routinely are granted such permission. ...
[Good News Club vs.
Milford Central Schools, 6/11/01]@
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11th U.
S. Circuit Court of Appeals
AValidity of
affirmative action plan ...
Miami-Dade County's "troublesome" affirmative action plan to
eliminate discrimination against women in its fire department may continue, but
only for a limited period of time, the 11th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled.
The court rejected
the appeal of a group of unsuccessful male firefighter applicants who argued
that they were the victims of improper discrimination during the challenged
period of 1994-97. They argued that the
county's affirmative action goal of 36 percent women was unreachable, and said
the plan should be ruled invalid. The
11th Circuit agreed that the county's plan may be flawed, but said
the plaintiffs failed to show how it adversely affected them directly. Although the court allowed the county plan
to stand, it called the county's response to the concerns
"troublesome" and said its patience with the plan is limited.
"An
affirmative action plan may not go on forever.
Simply because discrimination in the form of affirmative action may be
lawful at one point in time does not mean that such discrimination may be
countenanced in the future," the court said. "The Department has now been granting preferential treatment
to female applicants for nearly two decades.
When government voluntarily adopts an affirmative action plan to remedy
the effects of its past discrimination, it must pursue its goals >with a sense of
urgency.= ... (A)
governmental body which is prepared to admit to a history of discrimination should
feel compelled to remedy its misconduct swiftly. ... Although we do not decide
today, based on the parties and record before us, that the plan was unlawful in
1994-97, there are serious questions about the ongoing validity of the
plan." [Danksine, et al., vs.
Miami-Dade Fire Department, 6/12/01]@
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3rd
District Court of Appeal
**AInjured government
Worker - statute of limitations ...
The three-year limit on suing a governmental agency begins to run when
an injury or damage occurs and not when the plaintiff discovers the alleged
wrongdoing behind it, the 3rd DCA said.
The court affirmed
the dismissal of a lawsuit against the Miami-Dade County School Board filed by
a former school employee injured in an on-the-job accident. Kenneth Sellers filed a claim for workers'
compensation and then notified the School Board of his injury and claim for
damages three years and three months after he was injured. Sellers argued that he only discovered the
board's wrongdoing during a deposition in the workers' compensation proceeding,
and therefore the three-year statute of limitations period should not begin to
run until that time.
The DCA disagreed,
citing a 1988 Florida Supreme Court holding that a cause of action accrues when
the injury occurs and the damage is sustained.
"The Sellerses cannot fault the School Board for their own
leisurely handling of their claim," the DCA said. [Sellers vs. Miami-Dade County School Board,
6/13/01]@
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4th
District Court of Appeal
AUnemployment -
supervisor's frequent criticism ... A
supervisor's repeated criticism that an injured employee was not doing enough
work may have offended the worker but did not rise to the level of harassment
sufficient to justify unemployment benefits after the employee quit, the 4th
DCA held.
The court upheld a
conclusion of the Unemployment Appeals Commission, which denied benefits for a
woman who quit her job after she complained that her supervisor was
"harassing" her with emails detailing the amount of work he expected
of her. The supervisor's email messages
began after the woman suffered an injury and was unable to handle the volume of
work she had previously handled.
An unemployment
benefits referee found that the woman had good cause to quit her job, but the
commission reversed. The DCA said it
agreed that "although appellant may have been offended by her supervisor's
technique, her supervisor had the right and responsibility to monitor the
work." [Hutchinson vs.
Unemployment Appeals Commission, 6/6/01]@
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5th
District Court of Appeal
AEmployee
termination - scope of review ... A
hearing officer exceeded the scope of his review when he said a community
college could terminate an employee at the end of his current contract even
though the employee's immediate firing was improper, the 5th DCA
said. ...
"By addressing
whether Creel had a reasonable expectation of continued employment without that
issue being noticed or otherwise raised or argued at the hearing, the ALJ
deprived Creel of procedural due process," the DCA held. The court set aside the school's order
terminating Creel's employment after the fiscal year, instead affirming a
suspension. [Creel vs. District Board of Trustees of Brevard Community College,
6/8/01]@
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Part VII. MISCELLANEOUS
=======================================================================
CITATION DISCLAIMER - This summary
should not be cited. For that purpose, the cases may be acquired by contacting FSLRS,
PERC,
FEN district representatives,
FPELRA representatives, jurisdiction labor relations officers or their attorneys for particular cases.
The Florida School Labor Relations Service is a joint venture of the Florida School Boards Association
and the Florida Association of District School Superintendents. Its
publications are designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in regard to public
employee labor relations and collective bargaining. This information is
provided with the understanding that FSLRS is not engaged in rendering legal
service. If legal advice or assistance
is required, contact your attorney.
======================================================================
Marcus Johnston, Executive Director
Florida School Labor Relations Service
203 South Monroe Street
Tallahassee, Florida 32301
850/414-2587 - SUNCOM 994-2587
FAX - 850/414-2585 - SUNCOM 994-2585