OFFICIAL PEUBLICATION OF THE O R D E R
S U M M A R Y
PLEASE COPY TO SCHOOL BOARD MEMBERS
AND
ADMINISTRATORS AS NEEDED.
**School Board
Cases
VOL. XXVI . . . . . . . . . . . . March 27, 2002 . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . NO. 09
PART I . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ORDERS ISSUED BY PERC
**CA-2002-016;
Order 02GC-063 (March 6, 2002)
BEVERLY WALKER, Charging
Party,
v.
MIAMI-DADE COUNTY
PUBLIC SCHOOLS, Respondent.
The General Counsel
summarily dismisses the charge that the employer violated the Act by dismissing
Walker from employment.
AThe charge asserted that
additional supporting documents would be submitted. However, supporting documents were not attached to the charge or
subsequently filled ...
The scope of the
Commission's jurisdiction over disputes between a public employee and her
employer is limited to ensuring that the rights provided employees by Chapter 447,
Part II, are not abridged. If a charge
fails to allege that the violative action was taken as a result of the charging
party=s exercise of rights set
forth in section 447.301, Fla. Stat., the Commission lacks jurisdiction to
remedy that action, whatever it may be.@
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UC-2002-001;
Order 02E-064 (March 6, 2002)
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
FIREMEN & OILERS, SEIU, LOCAL 1227, Petitioner,
v.
CITY OF BOYNTON BEACH, Respondent.
ALocal 1227 seeks the
inclusion of seven "new" classifications into a bargaining unit of
City of Boynton Beach (City) non-supervisory operational services (blue-collar)
employees it currently represents [certification 138]. Local 1227 also sought to move employees in
the classification of service writer from the non-supervisory white-collar
unit it represents [certification 1211], to the non-supervisory blue-collar
unit.@
PERC accepts the hearing
officer=s recommendation which
determined that local 1227 failed to provide evidence to satisfy the Commission=s threshold criteria for
entertaining a unit clarification petition.
The petition is dismissed.
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UC-2002-002;
Order 02E-065 (March 6, 2002)
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
FIREMEN & OILERS, SEIU, LOCAL 1227, Petitioner,
v.
CITY OF BOYNTON BEACH,
Respondent.
ALocal 1227, filed a unit-clarification
petition pursuant to Section 447.307, Florida Statutes, seeking to include the
animal control supervisor, communications shift supervisor, customer relations
supervisor, and housing rehabilitation inspector classifications in a
bargaining unit of non-supervisory white-collar employees of the
City of Boynton Beach [certification 1211] which it currently represents.
AThe threshold question in
consideration of the unit clarification petition is whether the unit
clarification procedure has been properly invoked. The Commission will consider a petition for unit clarification
only when the position at issue has been created or substantially altered after
certification of the bargaining unit, or the position was included or excluded
from the unit inadvertently or through misunderstanding. See Sarasota County PBA v. City of
Sarasota, 7 FPER & 12339 at 680 (1981); Seminole Education
Association v. School Board of Seminole County, 27 FPER & 32268 (2001).@
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CB-2002-003;
Order 02GC-066 (March 7, 2002)
ROSEVELT HUGHES, Charging
Party,
v.
LOCAL 2957, IAFF, AFL-CIO,
CLC, Respondent.
The General Counsel
summarily dismisses the charge that the union violated the Act by failing to
represent him fairly during a grievance hearing. An examination of the charge reveals that it is conclusional and
lacks factual specificity.
ATo demonstrate that Local
2957 violated its duty of fair representation, the charge contends that Jacobs
was not going to allow Hughes, at the meeting, to compare his offense to
offenses committed by other firefighters.
This assertion is based on an alleged statement by Brian Bowers ...
A charge must be
accompanied by sworn statements from persons having personal knowledge of the
allegations in the charge.@
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CA-2002-018;
Order 02GC-067 (March 7, 2002)
JOE FERRARA, Charging
Party,
v.
CITY OF WEST MIAMI,
Respondent.
The General Counsel
summarily dismisses the charge that the employer violated the Act by
transferring Ferrara from his detective position and by Ferrara=s not properly receiving
disability benefits or consideration for light duty assignments in connection
with an April 2000 on-duty car accident because as a union representative
he refused to coerce a fellow officer into resigning in October 1999. The charge is untimely.
AThe charge indicates that
Ferrara was transferred in January 2000 and his alleged disability and other
problems from the car accident occurred in April 2000. These dates are more than six months prior
to the filing of this charge. Without
more, all of the allegations in the charge appear to be untimely.@
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CB-2002-005;
Order 02GC-068 (March 8, 2002)
MICHAEL MOAKLEY, Charging
Party,
v.
LIUNA, PUBLIC EMPLOYEES= LOCAL 678, Respondent
The General Counsel
summarily dismisses the charge that the union violated the Act by unfairly
handling the ratification process for an agreement. The charge is untimely because it misses the 6 months deadline.
AEven if I consider the
charge timely, this allegation does not demonstrate a violation of the of the
duty of fair representation.@
Resubmitting a previously
rejected agreement for a second ratification vote is not illegal.
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CB-2002-004;
Order 02GC-069 (March 11, 2002)
ANTHONY ZITNICK, Charging
Party,
v.
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION
OF FIREFIGHTERS, LOCAL 2292, Respondent.
The General Counsel
summarily dismisses the charge that the union violated the Act by refusing to
represent Zitnick in a grievance.
AZitnick asserts that he was
employed by the City of Pembroke Pines and was a member of Local 2292. Zitnick was terminated by the City for
disseminating a coloring book to a class of kindergarten students and for
conducting a City-sponsored coloring contest among the students. Zitnick sought to grieve the termination but
Local 2292 declined to assist him, indicating the Zitnick would not prevail in
the grievance in its opinion.@
The requisite facts
necessary to prove a prima facie violation were neither stated in the charge or
filed as an evidentiary document. In
addition, the charge is untimely.
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CA-2002-019;
Order 02GC-070 (March 11, 2002)
ANTHONY ZITNICK, Charging
Party,
v.
CITY OF PEMBROKE PINES,
Respondent.
The General Counsel
summarily dismisses the charge that the employer violated the Act by
terminating Zitnick for disseminating a coloring book to a class of
kindergarten students and for conducting a City-sponsored coloring
contest among the students. The charge
also alleges the City refused to allow Zitnick's grievance concerning his
dismissal to proceed to arbitration because Zitnick's union declined to handle
the grievance.
A ... the charge lacks the
specificity as to when the events at issue occurred. This is problematic because it does not allow for determination
as to whether the charge was timely filed.@
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RC-2002-012;
Order 02E-071 (March 11, 2002)
LEE COUNTY PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION, Petitioner,
v.
LEE COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS, Respondent.
The petition to represent
blue-collar employees is dismissed.
A... These employees are currently not
represented. Upon review of the
petition pursuant to Section 447.307(3(a), Florida Statutes, we conclude that
the petition is deficient for the following reason.
Section 447.307(3)(d),
Florida Statutes provides:
No petition may be filed seeking an election in any
proposed or existing appropriate bargaining unit to determine the exclusive
bargaining agent within 12 months after the date of a commission order
verifying a representation election...
An administrative review of the Commission's records
reveals that a representation
certification election was held in a unit similar to
the proposed unit on February 28 and March 1, 2001.@
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**VP-2001-011;
012; 013; 014 and 015; Order 02VP-072 (March 13, 2002)
ANDREA J.B. CAGLE,
Complainant,
v.
ST. JOHNS COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Respondent.
PERC remands the cases to
the hearing officer, granting Cagle=s exceptions.
AIn a recent case the
Commission considered whether a veteran lost his preference by virtue of his
continued employment with a state agency after his preference arose under the
veteran's preference statute. Yount
v. Lee County, (Fla. PERC Feb. 22,
2002). Yount was ineligible for a
hiring preference when he applied for and was hired by a state agency because
he was not a Florida resident. We ruled
that Yount's continued employment after he established state residency and
became eligible for an employment preference did not extinguish his preference
because "[t]he plain meaning of Section 295.101 does not allow for
extinguishing an employment preference by a veteran's continued employment in
a position into which the veteran was hired without a preference
entitlement." Id. at page
3. The same rationale applies in the
instant case, that is, Cagle's continuous employment with Duval School District
does not extinguish the employment preference she acquired in 1996, because she
was not eligible for a preference when she applied for and was hired into a
position with the Duval School District in 1989.
For these reasons, we reject the hearing officer's
conclusion that Cagle's employment preference expired by virtue of her
continued employment with Duval School District after 1996. Accordingly, we grant Cagle's exceptions and
conclude that Cagle had a preference at the time she applied for the
teacher positions at the St. John School District.
As we noted in Yount
the intent of the veteran's preference statute has been interpreted by the
courts and the Commission as being to provide veterans with only one
opportunity to obtain regular government employment. Our ruling today appears to subvert that purpose by allowing a
veteran's spouse who currently holds government employment to receive a
preference to assert in seeking further government employment. However, Chapter 295, Florida Statutes, does
not permit an interpretation that would extinguish Cagle's employment
preference. As stated in Yount,
we leave it to the legislature to amend the statute should it wish to change
the outcome of factually similar cases in the future.@
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CA-2002-021;
Order 02GC-073 (March 14, 2002)
PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
CITY EMPLOYEES, INC., Charging Party,
v.
CITY OF JACKSONVILLE,
FLORIDA, Respondent.
The General Counsel
summarily dismisses the charge that the employer violated the Act by refusing
to adopt the ratified contract between the previous bargaining agent and the
employer that is scheduled to expire in 2003.
AThe City is under no
obligation to adopt its prior contract with AFSCME or to recognize PACE=s unilateral adoption of
the contract. Thus, even if the city
agreed to adopt the contract and then changed its mind prior to the formal
adoption its conduct was not unlawful.
Therefore, PACE=s unfair labor practice charge does not state a prima
facie violation of Section 447.501(1)(a) Florida Statutes.@
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VP-2001-010;
Order 02VP-074 (March 15, 2002)
WILLIAM R. MISKIEWICZ,
Complainant,
v.
ESCAMBIA COUNTY BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, Respondent.
AThe parties have entered
into an agreement to settle this case.
Upon consideration, the Commission hereby accepts their agreement and
incorporates it as a part of this final order.
Notwithstanding our
acceptance of the parties' settlement agreement, the Commission declines to be
bound by the agreement's provision permitting the Complainant to appeal to the
Commission any dissatisfaction he may have regarding the Respondent's
compliance with the terms of the settlement agreement. See Professional Association of
City Employees v. City of Jacksonville, 28 FPER & 33022 (2001). As a matter of policy, the Commission does
not enforce its final orders even when they incorporate the parties' agreement
to settle the case. Rather, in its
final order approving settlement agreements, and as we do here, the Commission
advises parties to those settlement agreements that enforcement lies in circuit
court pursuant to Section 447.5035, Florida Statutes. Accordingly, this complaint is DISMISSED.@
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CA-2002-013; Order 02GC-075 (March
15, 2002)
FLORIDA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
COUNCIL 79, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Charging Party,
v.
THE HONORABLE JEB BUSH,
GOVERNOR, Respondent.
The General Counsel
summarily dismisses the amended charge that the employer violated the Act by
advising employees of a monthly union dues increase.
AIt is now clear that the
statements in the challenged e-mail were accurate. That is, Council 79 did raise its dues by $1.90 per month and the
members had already been notified.
Thus, the electronic notice from the DOR >coordinator/benefits and
payroll= was neither a threat nor
did it interfere with or coerce union members in the exercise of collective
bargaining rights, especially since they already knew of the dues increase.@
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VP-2001-010;
Order 02VP-076 (March 18, 2002)
WILLIAM R. MISKIEWICZ,
Complainant,
v.
ESCAMBIA COUNTY BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, Respondent.
Identical order as >074' above, but the
Complainant=s counsel was inadvertently omitted as attorney of record.
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CA-2002-024;
Order 02GC-077 (March 18, 2002)
FLORIDA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
COUNCIL 79, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Charging Party,
v.
THE HONORABLE JEB BUSH,
GOVERNOR, STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent.
The General Counsel
summarily dismisses the charge that the employer violated the Act by refusing
to bargain in good faith by failing to honor a memorandum of agreement that
implements a negotiated wage increase for abuse registry counselors. The charge fails to name the AFSCME
representative which contacted the state representative to ask about increasing
that rate. There is also no evidence
that the members of the AFSCME statewide bargaining unit have ratified this
memorandum of agreement.
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CA-2002-023;
Order 02GC-078 (March 19, 2002)
ANGELO CRUZ, Charging
Party,
v.
HILLSBOROUGH AREA REGIONAL
TRANSIT, Respondent.
The General Counsel
summarily dismisses the charge that the employer violated the Act when Cruz was
dismissed from employment with HARTline in June 2001 and September 2001
... when Cruz=s civil rights were
violated because he was not given an opportunity to tell his version of what
occurred either through witnesses or challenges made at hearings. Cruz has failed to provide any evidence that
he was engaged in an activity protected by chapter 447, Part II, or that his activity
was a substantial or motivating factor in Hartline=s decision to dismiss him
from employment.
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CB-2002-006;
Order 02GC-079 (March 19, 2002)
ANGELO CRUZ, Charging
Party,
v.
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION
LOCAL 1593, Respondent.
The General Counsel
summarily dismisses the charge that the union violated the Act by not meeting
with Cruz nor defending him when charges were made against him that resulted in
termination.
The requisite facts, which
must be contained within the charge itself, must include the names of the
individuals involved in the alleged unfair labor practice, and the time and
place of occurrence of the particular acts giving rise to the dispute. It appears that the charge is untimely.
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CA-2001-033;
Order 02U-080 (March 20, 2002)
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF
POLICE ASSOCIATIONS, AFL-CIO, Charging Party,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, Respondent.
PERC finds that the state
violated the Act by unilaterally changing law-enforcement officers work
schedules and refusing to bargaining the changes. However, contrary to the hearing officer=s conclusions, the factual
findings persuaded PERC that the union failed to meet its burden of proving
that the state did not provide it with a reasonable opportunity to negotiate
the impact of the work assignment changes.
PERC found that the record showed that all the union was required to do
was to identify the impacts of safety and workload, yet it failed to do so from
April 2nd through May 8th, 2001.
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RC-2002-015;
Order 02E-081 (March 21, 2002)
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
FIREMEN & OILERS/SEIU, LOCAL 1227, AFL-CIO, Petitioner,
v.
PALM TRAN, INC., and PALM
BEACH COUNTY, Respondent,
PERC dismisses the petition
to represent operation supervisor, utility supervisor, maintenance supervisor,
road supervisor, and foreman. The
Commission has previously defined a
unit for non-professional supervisor employees for this employer and absent a
showing of changed circumstances, such as substantial changes in the job duties
of the joint employees, the previously define unit is presumed to be correct.
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PART II . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Court Orders
[From Attorney General=s Appellate Alert]
U.S. Supreme Court
AFamily and Medical Leave -
required notice ... The government cannot
require employers to notify workers when the leave time they use might be
counted against the period allowed by the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993,
the U.S. Supreme Court held.
Ruling 5-4 in favor
of employers, the court struck down a U.S. Labor Department regulation that
required employers to tell their workers how their leave policies affect the
time authorized by the FMLA. The
decision was a defeat for former Arkansas factory worker Tracy Ragsdale, who
developed cancer and used up the 30 weeks of leave allowed by the company.
Ragsdale argued that she should still be able to use the 12 unpaid weeks
allowed by the FMLA, but the Supreme Court said the company was within its
bounds to include the FMLA leave within the more lenient period of time it had
already given Ragsdale.
"Ragsdale has not
shown that she would have taken less leave or intermittent leave if she had
received the required notice," Justice Kennedy wrote for the court. "Even if Wolverine had complied with the notice
regulations, Ragsdale still would have taken the entire 30-week
absence. Blind to this reality, the
(regulation) required the company to grant Ragsdale 12 more weeks of leave -
and rendered it liable ... when it denied her request and terminated
her." [Ragsdale v. Wolverine World
Wide, Inc., 3/19/02]@
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11th U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals
**ALiability for arrest and strip
search of student ... A school board
and county cannot be held liable for an allegedly unlawful arrest and strip
search resulting from a zero tolerance school violence policy that required
school officials to report criminal behavior to police, the 11th
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals held.
Liliana Cuesta and eight
other high school students were arrested for anonymously distributing a
publication titled "First Amendment," which singled out the school's
principal and teachers for contempt and threats of violence. Fearing for his safety shortly after the pamphlet
was distributed around the school, the principal followed the Dade County
School Board's zero tolerance policy and called police. Cuesta, who was at least 18, was booked and
strip searched at a Turner Guilford Knight Correctional Facility, or TGK. Four days later the state attorney's office
decided not to file criminal charges against any of the students because recent
court decisions had rendered the statute in question unconstitutional and
unenforceable. Cuesta sued the school
board for the arrest and the county for the strip search, claiming they
violated her First and Fourth Amendments rights, but the 11th
Circuit ruled against her.
Addressing the strip
search, the 11th Circuit concluded, "Cuesta's constitutional
rights were not violated because TGK officers had reasonable suspicion to
search based upon the violent and threatening language and imagery contained in
the pamphlet. The record makes evident
that TGK personnel knew about the violent contents of the pamphlet." [Cuesta v. School Board of Miami-Dade
County, et al., 3/14/02]@
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Florida Supreme Court
AInitiative for slot machines at pari-mutuels
rejected
... A proposed constitutional amendment to allow slot machines at pari-mutuel
facilities will not appear on the November ballot because it violates the
single-subject requirement and its ballot language is misleading, the
Florida Supreme Court held.
The court, by a 4-3
margin, concluded that the proposal improperly seeks to combine the two
disparate provisions, authorizing the approval, licensure and taxation of slot
machines while simultaneously creating a limited exception to the
constitutional requirement that new state taxes be added to the Constitution by
a two-thirds vote. Either
proposition would be acceptable, the court said, but they cannot be combined
into a single initiative. For similar
reasons, the court said, the initiative's ballot summary is invalid.
"The initiative
considered here purports to create a mechanism for authorizing and taxing slot
machines for a particular purpose in the same proposal which would effectively
amend article XI, section 7, to remove this new state tax from the ambit of
that provision. Because it thus fails
to comport with the constitution's single subject limitation, it is disapproved
for inclusion on the ballot," the court said. The majority consisted of Chief Justice Wells and Justices
Harding, Lewis and Quince. [Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General re;
Authorization for County Voters to Approve or Disapprove Slot Machines within
Existing Pari-Mutuel Facilities, 3/14/02]@
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5th District
Court of Appeal
**A"Relation-back" doctrine -
government agencies ... Two separate
government agencies are not necessarily sufficiently connected for the
"relation-back" doctrine to be used to fix an error in which
the wrong entity was named as a defendant in a lawsuit, the 5th DCA
said.
A teenager who severely
broke her legs in a fall on school grounds filed suit against Volusia County,
rather than the county school board.
The plaintiff attempted to amend the complaint after the statute of
limitations had expired, but the trial court dismissed her complaint. The plaintiff argued on appeal that the
relation-back doctrine should apply because the error was merely a
misnomer, but the DCA disagreed.
"An amended complaint
does not relate back to the original filing date where it has the effect of
adding a new party to the cause of action," the DCA said. "We affirm the trial court here because
we do not find that the School Board and the County are sufficiently related to
justify application of the relation-back doctrine. Although both are subdivisions of the State,
they are independent agencies and the required identity of interest is not
present." [Patel v. School Board of
Volusia County, 3/8/02]@
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PART IV . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SPECIAL MASTER
SM-2002-002
(Louis M. Thomson, Jr.) (March 11, 2002)
FLORIDA BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Employer,
AND
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF
STATE, COUNTY, AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, COUNCIL 79, union.
ISSUE: THE SPECIAL MASTER WOULD FIND THAT THE ISSUE
BEFORE HIM IS: "IS THE STATE OF
FLORIDA FINANCIALLY ABLE, WITH THE CURRENT BUDGET/ ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, TO FUND ANNUAL
ACROSS THE BOARD INCREASES TO THE UNIVERSITY EMPLOYEES?
RECOMMENDATIONS THAT:
[1] THE PARTIES UTILIZE A WAGE PROPOSAL BASED UPON THE
CONVENTIONAL SYSTEM THE PARTIES HAVE USED IN THEIR CURRENT CBA UNTIL THE
"NEW" SYSTEM BEFORE THE FLORIDA LEGISLATURE BECOMES A REALITY.
[2] AN ACROSS THE BOARD WAGE INCREASE FOR THE
BARGAINING UNIT OF 1.5% BE ENACTED FOR THE PERIOD OF JUNE1, 2002 TO JUNE 1,
2003, WITH A MINIMUM OF $500.00 PER EMPLOYEE.
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==================================================================
CITATION
DISCLAIMER - This summary should not be cited. For that purpose, the
cases may be acquired by contacting FSLRS, PERC, FEN district representatives,
FPELRA representatives, jurisdiction labor relations officers or their
attorneys for particular cases.
The Florida School Labor Relations Service
is a joint venture of the
Florida School Boards Association
and the
Florida Association of District School
Superintendents".
Its publications
are designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in regard to
public employee labor relations and collective bargaining. This information is provided with the
understanding that FSLRS is not engaged in rendering legal service. If legal advice or assistance is required,
contact your attorney.
==================================================================
Marcus Johnston,
Executive Director
Florida School
Labor Relations Service
203 South Monroe
Street
Tallahassee,
Florida 32301
850/414-2587
- SUNCOM 994-2587
FAX -
850/414-2585 - SUNCOM 994-2585