VOL. XXVI  . . . . . . . . . . . . January 30, 2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . NO. 03

PART I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ORDERS ISSUED BY PERC

 

 

RC-2001-059; Order 02E-014 (January 23, 2002)

COCOA FIREFIGHTERS, LOCAL 2416, IAFF, Petitioner,

v.

CITY OF COCOA, Respondent,

AThe Commission found the petition sufficient and assigned a hearing officer.  On January 9, the parties filed a consent election agreement and joint stipulations.

...  As there is sufficient time prior to the issuance of the Commission's order directing election for the employees to determine whether they object to their managerial designation, the City is directed to provide a copy of the attached notice to the deputy and the assistant chiefs not later than January 28 and file with the Commission an affidavit or other proof that affected employees were provided notice.  In lieu of voting a challenged ballot, employees shall have until February 4 in which to contact the Commission in writing to contest the designation.@

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EL-2001-050 (Relates to RC-2001-050) (January 28, 2002)

PINELLAS LODGE NO. 43, FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, Petitioner,

v.

CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG, Respondent,

v.

PINELLAS COUNTY POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC., Intervenor.

Election results and order dismissing the petition challenging Certification No. 87 for police officers below the rank of Sergeant.  440 eligible voters cast 122 votes for the petitioner and 214 for the bargaining agent.  Certification No. 87 remains in effect.

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CA-2002-006; Order 02GC-015 (January 28, 2002)

DENNIS RAY MAYTON, JR., AND IBEW, LOCAL UNION 359-2, Charging Parties,

v.

CITY OF HOMESTEAD, Respondent.

The General Counsel summarily dismisses the charge that the employer violated the Act by not complying with the contractual grievance procedure.  The charge alleges that the city has failed to timely process grievances.  AHowever, there are no facts included in the charge from which I can determine whether the city committed an unfair labor practice.@

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PART II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Court Orders

[From Attorney General=s Appellate Alert]

U.S. Supreme Court

ARequirements for civil commitment of sexual predators ... States wishing to impose civil commitment on violent sexual predators need only show that the offender's mental abnormality or personal disorder makes it difficult for him to control his behavior, not that the predator has a complete lack of control, the U.S. Supreme Court held.

The court, in a 7-2 decision, said state courts must make some determination that the offender lacks self-control.  However, the justices rejected a Kansas court's position that a 1997 Supreme Court ruling meant the state had to prove the offender's a total or complete lack of control.

"(M)ost severely ill people - even those commonly termed >psychopaths= - retain some ability to control their behavior.  Insistence upon absolute lack of control would risk barring the civil commitment of highly dangerous persons suffering severe mental abnormalities,"  Justice Breyer wrote for the court. "(W)e recognize that in cases where lack of control is at issue, >inability to control behavior=  will not be demonstrable with mathematical precision.  It is enough to say that there must be proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior.  And this ... must be sufficient to distinguish the dangerous sexual offender whose serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case."  [Kansas v. Crane, 1/22/02]@

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First District Court of Appeal

**ADismissal after statute of limitations expires ...  A dismissal without prejudice has the practical effect of a dismissal with prejudice where the statute of limitations has expired and the petitioner cannot refile, the 1^st DCA said.

The court said a judge of compensation claims' dismissal of a case due to an attorney's failure to appear in person was improper because it left a public school employee with no recourse.  The DCA also said the attorney's absence was not a severe enough offense to warrant the harsh sanction of dismissal.  The attorney appeared by telephone and explained that his absence was due to a mixup caused by his secretary's cancer treatment, and the DCA said this constituted "good cause" sufficient to preclude dismissal.  The DCA also rejected the school district's argument that the employee was improperly appealing a non-final order.

"Dismissal without prejudice is final if its effect is to bring an end to judicial labor," the DCA said.  "It is uncontested that Appellant's claim would be time-barred if refiled; thus, the order is final."  [Martinez v. Collier County Public Schools, 1/18/02]@

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Second District Court of Appeal

ASunshine Law - committee of agency staffers ...  A committee of public agency staff members stood in for public officials and therefore was subject to the requirements of the Sunshine Law when it improperly approved a local development project, the 2^nd DCA held.

The court said the meeting at which the Charlotte County Development Review Committee approved an application for an affordable housing project violated the Sunshine Law by rendering a decision on the application before allowing for public input from citizens who objected to the project.  The county, by ordinance, granted final authority to approve project applications to the committee, which is made up of appointed staff members.  A trial court found that the committee was not a governmental body subject to the Sunshine Law because committee members were merely functioning in their individual capacities as county staff members.  The DCA disagreed.

"(W)hen, as here, public officials delegate their fact-finding duties and decision-making authority to a committee of staff members, those individuals no longer function as staff members but >stand in shoes of such public officials insofar as application of Government in Sunshine Law is concerned.=  Because the authority of final project approval has been delegated to the DRC by Charlotte County ordinance, county staff members who serve on the DRC function as public officials.  Hence, any DRC meeting at which quasi-judicial action will be taken is subject to Florida's Sunshine Law," the DCA said.  [Evergreen the Tree Treasurers of Charlotte County, Inc., et al., v. Charlotte County Board of County Commissioners, et al., 1/18/02]@

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PART IV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Opinions

[From Attorney General=s Appellate Alert]

**ASchool boards - good cause to change agenda ...  In response to a request from the Palm Beach County School Board, the Attorney General issued an advisory opinion stating in sum: "1) Under Section 120.525(2), Florida Statutes, the chair of the school board, as the presiding officer, is responsible for determining whether good cause exists for changes in the school board agenda after publication and distribution; 2) Section 120.525(2), Florida Statutes, does not conflict with the powers of the superintendent as set forth in Sections 230.32-230.33, Florida Statutes." [AGO-2002-08, 1/17/02]@

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MISCELLANEOUS

Tentative Agreement Reports

FEN Calendar

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CITATION DISCLAIMER - This summary should not be cited. For that purpose, the cases may be acquired by contacting FSLRS, PERC, FEN district representatives, FPELRA representatives, jurisdiction labor relations officers or their attorneys for particular cases.

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is a joint venture of the

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and the

Florida Association of District School Superintendents".

Its publications are designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in regard to public employee labor relations and collective bargaining.  This information is provided with the understanding that FSLRS is not engaged in rendering legal service.  If legal advice or assistance is required, contact your attorney.

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Florida School Labor Relations Service

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